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Insurance and Business Germany

Vulnerabilities - Germany

Transnational impacts of climate change

The true magnitude of economic consequences of climate change might be substantially underestimated by only including the direct impact on countries. For Europe, for instance, transnational effects of impacts in non-European countries on Europe through foreign trade channels must also be included. This ‘international spill-over’ of climate impacts has been quantified for Germany’s economy in 2050 for different climate scenarios. Germany is the largest European economy.

There are several climate impacts that may affect a country’s economy, such as floods and wildfires. The scientists focused on heat-induced labour productivity losses as an example, one of the most severe global impacts (24). They made global projections for 2050 (the period 2036 - 2065) for different scenarios of socio-economic development and a moderate and high-end scenario of climate change (RCP4.5 and RCP8.5), and compared these projections with the reference period 1981 - 2010.

Higher temperature and humidity may substantially influence the productivity of workers. Not only are workers more susceptible to illnesses, they are also more prone to errors and accidents due to declining concentration. A worker’s thermal comfort as well as his/her physical and physiological limits determines the work ability and has therefore a direct influence on the productivity of businesses or the total economy (25). As heat decreases productivity, products become more expensive, and trade flows may shift from strongly affected world regions to less affected regions. Also, productivity losses affect a country’s GDP: people may no longer be able to buy certain products and this also affects trade flows. Thus, in the example of Germany, transnational climate change impacts may affect both Germany’s import and export, and hence Germany’s trade balance.

The results of this study show that conditions for carrying out heavy work outdoors will deteriorate both in Europe and globally. Within Europe, this deterioration is strongest for southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain). Other European countries are only marginally affected. Globally, in particular Southeast Asian countries and India are severely impacted.

The study indicates that spill-over effects caused by labour productivity losses outside Europe are much more important for Germany’s trade balance than spill-over effects within Europe. In general, the combination of higher direct climate impacts and a more labour-intensive production in the economy results in negative impacts being stronger on countries outside Europe than on those within Europe for both GDP and welfare.

In general, this has two effects on Germany’s trade flows: total imports decline and total exports increase. The decline of imports results from a reduction of imports from outside Europe that is only partly compensated by an increase from European countries. The increase of exports results from a reduction of export to non-European countries being overcompensated by an increase of export to countries in the European Union.

Less import and more export means an increase in the German trade surplus. This could be viewed as beneficial from a German perspective at first glance. Indeed, the authors of this study conclude, the German economy is relatively better off than other world regions because it is less affected by direct impacts and can partly compensate losses in trade with regions outside Europe by gains in trade with European regions. However, all world regions loose in terms of GDP and welfare due to climate change: higher trade within Europe only displays a comparative improvement for Germany, but not an absolute one.

Naturally, the study is based on a number of assumptions, and actual developments may turn out quite different. For instance, there are several adaptation options available to counteract health impacts and productivity losses, including higher shares of air-conditioning, a shift of working hours to cooler periods of the day or the opportunity to adjust clothing (26). Also, people may adjust to heat stress and be able to cope with it more easily in 2050 than currently (27).


Insurance for flood damage is already possible. The insurance industry assesses the risk of damage to a building on the basis of a zoning system that takes into account not only the flood risk itself, but also the risk of torrential rainfall and backwater build-up. To date, however, there has been little demand for such damage policies. Nevertheless, since insurance for flood damage is a significant factor in the context of individual flood control precautions by the public, the possibility of introducing compulsory insurance for damage due to the elements, such as flooding, hail and windstorms, has already been discussed – most recently in the wake of the Elbe floods in August 2002 (1).

Across Germany, only an estimated 10% of households have supplementary flood coverage (in former East Germany: around 30% of households in these states). Allianz reports that increases in premiums of 7 to 9 % are likely as a result of the floods and other storm events (2). Market penetration of elementary loss insurance is above national average in former East Germany due to the fact that after the German reunification many commercial insurers decided to continue the policies of the compulsory home insurance of the East German government, which included coverage against all known kinds of natural risks including flooding (21).

In Germany, private insurance companies have provided natural hazards insurance as a supplement to building or contents insurance since 1991. This supplemental contract covers losses due to floods, torrential rain, earthquakes, land subsidence, avalanches, and snow buildup. By default, losses due to windstorms and fires are covered by any building insurance policy. Losses due to storm surges are an uninsurable risk in Germany. 70% of the companies also provide coverage for losses due to backwater in stormwater drainage systems, whereas losses caused by a rise in groundwater level are covered only by a small percentage of the insurance companies (20).

In the future, the insurance industry will no longer calculate its premiums entirely on the basis of past experience, but will make allowance for the expected effects of climate change. Pension funds and other investors in long-term infrastructure projects are also beginning to reassess the risks (10). From future projections of winter storm losses in the German private household sector it was concluded that global-warming induced increases in insured losses under the A1B scenario are generically to be expected, but can be handled within the existing insurance frameworks in Germany (19).

In Germany, regional authorities and commercial insurance companies are starting to more closely align their actions, shifting more responsibility for flood prevention to the individual policy holder (22).


Climate change means considerable risks for many businesses. Storms, intense rainfall and floods could damage or destroy industrial facilities or release hazardous substances. This calls for precautions by plant safety managers. Turbulent weather could also have an impact on operations, e.g. in the event of personnel or materials failing to reach the factory. If electricity, telecommunications or water supplies are interrupted by severe weather conditions, this could also result in operations coming to a standstill elsewhere. All this can prove very expensive (10).

Opportunities - Germany

Adaptation to climate change also offers great opportunities for innovative companies and exporters of  environmental technology. For example, many companies in Germany have developed and implemented water-saving and wastewater-free processes since the 1980s. Technical innovations and thermal insulation create new possibilities for the building industry – and opens up opportunities for innovation and employment (10).

Insured losses - Globally

Globally, insured and total property losses are rising faster than premiums, population, or economic growth; inflation adjusted economic losses from catastrophic events rose by 8-fold between the 1960s and 1990s and insured losses by 17-fold. Large catastrophic events cause less damage in an average year than the aggregated impacts of relatively small events (a 40/60 ratio globally) (9).

In the United States, averaged over the past 55 years, weather-related events have been responsible for 93% of all catastrophe events, 83% of the economic damages of natural disasters, and 87% of the insured losses. ... The observed upward trend in losses is consistent with what would be expected under climate change and with demographic factors (9).

Flood risk insurance in Europe

Insurance can be considered an adaptation strategy since it reduces the follow-on economic impacts of extreme events and thus stabilizes the income and consumption stream of the affected, and thus clearly reduces vulnerability and impacts (17).

Different insurance and compensation systems

Insurance and compensation systems for flood risk in Europe have been divided into three categories (11):

  1. Traditional (private) insurance systems. This system is in place in most European countries (in 15 out of 19 studied countries). Systems are set up and managed by private companies, where the cover is financed from premiums that are paid before the event (ex ante). Some of these systems may have support from the government, for instance through state-guaranteed reinsurance. Countries where at least half the population has taken out flood insurance are: Portugal, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Norway and Sweden. Countries where less than half of the population has taken out flood insurance are: Italy, Greece, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic Germany, Poland, Finland;
  2. Insurance or pooling systems in which the government has a considerable role, through setting up and managing the pool. Cover is provided through ex ante premiums or ex ante taxes on insurance policies. This is the case in Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland. In Belgium, however, a compulsory insurance system has been put in place since late 2005;
  3. Systems administered by the government, consisting of ex post compensation of flood losses. These systems are not considered to be insurance, as the basic property of ex ante premium or tax collection is not present. Rather, loss compensation is paid from tax money, either ad hoc or through budget reservations. Out of 19 studied European countries this system is only in place in the Netherlands.

Insurance markets are rather imperfect and are unlikely to generate adequate adaptation responses to climate risk due to uncertainty and imperfect information, missing and misaligned markets and financial constraints. Government support is therefore necessary and widespread in the EU and elsewhere. Governments of EU member states regulate, subsidize or even offer insurance for flood or drought risks; yet, in many instances markets and public-private partnership offer only limited coverage or are extremely restricted, such as for flood risk in the Netherlands, which leads to substantial government liabilities for member states, which to some extent are buffered by the EU solidarity fund government compensation scheme (12).

The table below summarizes the key properties of insurance and compensation systems for covering losses incurred by households and business in a selection of EU member states (13). Private insurance systems (“bundle system” or the “option system”) are distinguished from government solutions (ex post compensation by the government, paid from tax revenues). The fifth column indicates whether private insurance is compulsory. Finally, the level of market penetration of the insurance system has been estimated.

Member state Insurance/compensation system Insurance compulsory Market penetration
  Private, ex ante, premium bundled Private, ex ante, premium optional Government, ex post compensation    
Austria   X     10-25%
Belgium X     X >75%
Czech Republic   X     25-75%
Finland   X X   10-25%
France X     X >75%
Germany   X X   10-25%
Greece X   X   <10%
Hungary X   X   40-60%
Italy   X     <10%
Netherlands   X X   <5%
Poland   X X   25-75%
Portugal X       25-75%
Spain X   X X 25-75%
Sweden X   X   >75%
UK X       >75%

EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF)

Recognising that floods and other disasters may lead to overburdening national governments and necessitate international assistance even in Europe, the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was created after the floods in central Europe in summer 2002 and entered into force on November 15th of that year (14,18). Member states, and countries applying for accession, can request aid in the event of a major natural or technological disaster (15). The fund provides financial aid for emergency measures in the event of a natural disaster causing direct damages above 3 billion Euros (at 2002 prices) or 0.6% of the GNI (16). Fund support can be mobilized even if the threshold is not met, e.g. for a neighbouring country that is affected by the same major natural disaster or for extraordinary regional disasters which affect the majority of the population of a region and have serious effects on its economic stability and living conditions. There is no equivalent to addressing drought and water scarcity, however (12).

The current EU extreme event interventions are not sufficient to cope with future extreme events projected to increase in size and intensity as a result of climate change (12).

Vulnerabilities - Overview

The insurability of natural disasters and extreme weather events may be affected by increases in the frequency, severity, or unpredictability of these events. ... Climate change presents various challenges to insurability. These include technical and market-based risks (9):

Technical Risks

  • Shortening times between loss events, such as more hurricanes per season,
  • Changing absolute and relative variability of losses,
  • Changing structure of types of events,
  • Shifting spatial distribution of events,
  • Damages that increase exponentially or nonlinearly with weather intensity,
  • Widespread geographical simultaneity of losses (e.g. from tidal surges arising from a broad die-off of protective coral reefs or disease outbreaks on multiple continents),
  • Increased difficulty in anticipating "hot spots" (geographic and demographic) for particular hazards,
  • More single events with multiple, correlated consequences. This was well evidenced in the pan-European heat catastrophe of 2003. Immediate or delayed impacts included extensive human morbidity and mortality, wildfire, massive crop losses, and the curtailment of electric power plants due to the temperature or lack of cooling water, and
  • More hybrid events with multiple consequences (e.g. El Nino-related rain, ice storms, floods, mudslides, droughts, and wildfires).

Market-based Risks

  • Historically-based premiums that lag behind actual losses,
  • Failing to foresee and keep up with changing customer needs arising from the consequences of climate change,
  • Unanticipated changes in patterns of claims, and associated difficulty in adjusting pricing and reserve practices to maintain profitability,
  • Responses of insurance regulators,
  • Reputation risks falling on insurers who do not, in the eyes of consumers, do enough to prevent losses arising from climate change, and
  • Stresses unrelated to weather but conspiring with climate change impacts to amplify the net adverse impact. These include draw-downs of capital and surplus due to earthquakes or terrorist attacks and increased competition from self-insurance or other competing methods of risk-spreading.

Pressure on insurance affordability & availability under climate change

Extreme weather events have already precipitated contraction of insurance coverage in some markets, and the process can be expected to continue if the losses from such events increase in the future. Impacts vary, of course, depending on the specific circumstances, and can be relatively minor (gradual price increases) to more significant. For the United States, the following outlook has been presented for different types of issues (9):

  • Flood - currently a mix of public/private insurance and risk sharing. Under climate change, insurability problems may extend from the present personal and small commercial lines into larger commercial lines.
  • Windstorm—a largely insured risk at present. There are already considerable insurability problems and associated changes in terms and pricing, non-renewals, market withdrawl, etc. This could increase dramatically under climate change, resulting in shifting of losses to governments and consumers.
  • Agriculture and livestock—currently a public/private insurance partnership. Climate change will stress this sector considerably, with potential for impacts due to drought, flood, pests, or other events on a scale with the Great Dust Bowl of the 1930s.
  • Wildfire—currently largely privately insured. More retention of risk by purchasers of insurance and more involvement by state governments is anticipated, while insurers raise deductibles and reduce limits of liability and scope of coverage.
  • Mold and moisture damage—largely commercially insured until the crisis emerged a few years ago. Now, many states have exclusions.
  • Earth movement and coastal erosion—primarily insured by government, if at all. With permafrost melt, subsidence of dry soils, sinkholes will become more prevalent, as will mudslides and property losses from coastal erosion. Government programs covering storm-surge-driven losses on eroded property could be overwhelmed with losses under climate change, with the result of more retention by property owners.
  • Health impacts—currently largely privately insured. An insurability crisis under climate change is not anticipated. Impacts will manifest in the form of elevated health insurance prices.

Vulnerabilities - Europe

It is estimated that losses from weather events are doubling globally every 12 years. Even though the observed increase in losses is dominated by socio-economic factors (such as population growth, increased number of habitations in vulnerable areas, increased wealth, increased amount and value of vulnerable infrastructure), there is evidence that changing patterns of natural disasters are also drivers (3). It is however not known how much of this increase in losses can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change (4). After accounting for changes in population and wealth, it has been shown that changes in extreme weather events may be responsible for a growth in losses by about 2% a year since the 1970s (8).

In Europe, 64 % of all loss events since 1980 are directly attributable to weather and climate events (storms, floods and heat-waves) and 25 % to wild fires, cold spells, landslides and avalanches, which are also linked to weather and climate. 95 % of the overall losses and 78 % of all deaths caused by disastrous events result from such weather and climate-related events. The annual average number of these weather- and climate-related events in Europe increased during the period 1998–2007 by about 65 % compared with the 1980s (5).

Swiss Re has estimated that in Europe the costs of a 100-year storm event could double by the 2080s with climate change (to EUR 40 billion compared with EUR 20 billion today), while average storm losses are estimated to increase by 16–68 % over the same period (3). Analyses of long-term records of flood losses indicate that societal and economic factors have played an important role in the observed upward trends (6).

According to an estimate by the Reinsurance Association of America (RAA), 50% of insured losses in the world within the last 40 years have been the consequence of natural catastrophes in the 1990s. Insurance experts have warned that large regions of the world may be recategorised as ineligible for insurance, because changes in weather caused by climate change (such as heat waves and hurricanes) continue at an accelerating pace (7).

Climate change is expected to lead to an increase in compensable damage, which will contribute to increased insurance premiums. This means that extreme events will result in an increased level of risk in the insurance sector. Climate change may lead to increased costs and maybe even the bankruptcy of insurance companies (7).

Adaptation strategies


It is foreseeable that there will be an increase in demand for property insurance covering damage due to natural hazards. In addition to the insurance companies’ usual instruments and business models, new financial market products will be developed for specific risks to enable businesses or countries to cover climate risks on the capital market. These include weather derivatives, catastrophe bonds or other special bonds (10).


According to the German adaptation strategy, the Commission on Process Safety (KAS) has made the following proposals (10):

  • design plants covered by the major accident regulations to withstand more frequent and more severe storms;
  • protect plants from extreme rainfall and floods make emergency plans and risk prevention plans;
  • improve safety management;
  • take account of the requirements of climate change when drafting legal and technical regulations.


The references below are cited in full in a separate map 'References'. Please click here if you are looking for the full references for Germany.

  1. Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (2006)
  2. RMS (2003)
  3. UNEP FI (2006), in: EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
  4. Höppe et al.(2006), in: EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
  5. EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
  6. Pielke Jr and Downton (2000); Mills (2005); Barredo (2007), in: EEA, JRC and WHO (2008)
  7. Marttila et al. (2005)
  8. Muir-Wood et al. (2006), in: Ward et al. (2008)
  9. Mills et al. (2005)
  10. Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2009)
  11. Bouwer et al. (2007)
  12. Aakre et al. (2010)
  13. Bouwer et al. (2007); CEA (2009); Swiss Re (1998); ISDR (2005); OECD (2005); Paklina (2003), in: Aakre et al. (2010)
  14. EUFR (2004), in: Aakre et al. (2010)
  15. EUFR (2002), in: Aakre et al. (2010)
  16. Council Regulation (2002), in: Aakre et al. (2010)
  17. Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler (2007), in: Aakre et al. (2010)
  18. Hochrainer et al. (2010)
  19. Held et al. (2013)
  20. Thieken et al. (2006)
  21. Schwarze (2004a,b), in: Keskitalo et al. (2014)
  22. Keskitalo et al. (2014)
  23. Knittel et al. (2020)
  24. Dellink et al. (2017); Kjellstrom and McMichael (2013); Roson and Van der Mensbrugghe (2012), all in: Knittel et al. (2020)
  25. Kjellstrom et al. (2009a, 2009b), both in: Knittel et al. (2020)
  26. Takakura et al. (2017); Day et al. (2019); Morgan and de Dear (2003), all in: Knittel et al. (2020)
  27. Kjellstrom et al. (2016), in: Knittel et al. (2020)