Russia
Permafrost
What is permafrost?
Simply defined, permafrost is ground which remains at temperatures below 0°C for at least two consecutive years. Permafrost is considered ‘continuous’ when more than 90% of an area is underlain by permafrost; permafrost is defined as ‘discontinuous’ or ‘sporadic’ when percentages are lower. Permafrost occupies nearly 65% of the territory of the Russian Federation. Permafrost is a very common phenomenon east of the Ural Mountains; the extent in the European part of Russia is limited (35).
Changes in permafrost until now
The permafrost regions occupy about 25% of the Northern Hemisphere's terrestrial surface, and almost 65% of that of Russia (1,35). Warming, thawing, and degradation of permafrost have been observed in many locations in recent decades and are likely to accelerate in the future as a result of climatic change (1,35,43). The Western Russian Arctic is experiencing some of the highest rates of permafrost degradation globally. From the mid-1970s to 2018, mean annual air temperatures have increased at rates from 0.05 to 0.07 °C/year. Mean annual ground temperatures have increased from 0.03 to 0.06 °C/year at 10–12 m depth in the continuous permafrost zone. The permafrost table at all sites has lowered, up to 8 m in the discontinuous permafrost zone (43).
Read moreChanges in permafrost in the 21st century
In 2012 the IPCC concluded that it is likely that there has been warming of permafrost in recent decades. There is high confidence that permafrost temperatures will continue to increase, and that there will be increases in active layer thickness and reductions in the area of permafrost in the Arctic and subarctic (19).
Changes of permafrost have important implications for natural systems, humans, and the economy of the northern lands. Model results indicate that between now and 2050 near-surface permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere may shrink by 15%-30%, leading to complete thawing of the frozen ground in the upper few meters, while elsewhere the depth of seasonal thawing may increase on average by 15%-25%, and by 50% or more in the northernmost locations (1).
Read morePermafrost degradation and ground settlement under 2 °C global warming
Global warming of 2°C above preindustrial levels has been considered to be the threshold that should not be exceeded to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system. What will a 2°C rise of global mean temperature lead to with respect to the degradation of permafrost, covering 1/4 of the Northern Hemisphere? This was studied by estimating permafrost soil temperature increase under 2°C global warming with ten climate models (GCMs), and quantifying the resulting thaw and settlement of the soil (29).
Read moreVulnerabilities - Infrastructure
Serious public concerns are associated with the effects that thawing permafrost may have on the infrastructure constructed on it. Climate-induced changes of permafrost properties are potentially detrimental to almost all structures in northern lands, and may render many of them unusable. Degradation of permafrost and ground settlement due to thermokarst may lead to dramatic distortions of terrain and to changes in hydrology and vegetation, and may lead ultimately to transformation of existing landforms (1).
Two major risks to buildings and infrastructure are associated with permafrost degradation: ground subsidence and bearing capacity. Ground subsidence is associated with the melting of spatially heterogeneous ground ice, accompanied by the consolidation of sediments under progressive thickening of the active layer. This process can be a major hazard for critical infrastructure (e.g. roads, railroads) and, as a result, can negatively impact the connectivity and accessibility of northern communities by land. The bearing capacity of foundations on permafrost is dependent on permafrost characteristics. Permafrost warming can reduce the ability of foundations to support buildings and structures, leading to deformations and ultimately structural failure (35).
Read moreThe cost of permafrost degradation by the mid-21st century
Permafrost regions are important for Russia’s economy because of the extraction of several resources. For instance, within Russia, more than 15% of oil and 80% of gas production was concentrated in the Arctic regions in 2016. It is a major logistical challenge to connect these resource-rich but distant areas with the industrial and financial centers in the European parts of Russia. Over the last hundred years, complex transportation networks consisting of pipelines, airports, permanent and seasonal roads, local and federal railroads, river and oceanic ports have been developed to allow the flow of goods, services, and people between these isolated production centers and consumers in European Russia and abroad. The majority of these networks is located in or traverses through permafrost zones (35).
The cost of buildings and infrastructure affected by permafrost degradation by mid-21st century has been estimated for climate change projections based on six GCM climate models and a high-end scenario of climate change (the so-called RCP 8.5 scenario). The period 2006-2015 was chosen as the present reference situation. The chosen scenario gives the upper limit of potential costs (35).
Read moreVulnerabilities – The permafrost carbon feedback
In high-latitude regions of the Earth, temperatures have risen 0.6 °C per decade, twice as fast as the global average (27). The resulting thaw of frozen ground exposes substantial quantities of organic carbon to decomposition by soil microbes (26). The permafrost region contains twice as much carbon as there is currently in the atmosphere (28). A substantial fraction of this material can be mineralized by microbes and converted to CO2 and CH4 on timescales of years to decades. At the proposed rates, the observed and projected emissions of CH4 and CO2 from thawing permafrost are unlikely to cause abrupt climate change over a period of a few years to a decade. Instead, permafrost carbon emissions are likely to be felt over decades to centuries as northern regions warm, making climate change happen faster than we would expect on the basis of projected emissions from human activities alone (26).
Increases in fire extent, severity, and frequency with continued climate warming will also impact vegetation and permafrost dynamics with increased likelihood of irreversible permafrost thaw that leads to increased carbon release and/or conversion of forest to shrublands (44).
Read moreVulnerabilities – Albedo change
Another potential feedback of thawing permafrost relates to changes in vegetation distribution. Shrubs and boreal forests may extent northward, resulting in a further positive climate feedback due to lower albedos over shrubs and forests compared to tundra grasses and moss (16).
Vulnerabilities – Impact on river runoff
Permafrost degradation impacts Arctic hydrology. Over the 30-year period from 1984 to 2013 warming-induced permafrost degradation has led to strong regime shifts in river runoff in river basins in southern Siberia. This shift can go in different directions, depending on the extent of permafrost. In a basin characterized by discontinuous, sporadic, and isolated permafrost, permafrost degradation has led to severe water loss via the enhanced infiltration of water that was previously stored close to the surface; this basin exhibits a significant decreasing trend of runoff. In basin where the thickened active layer is still underlain by a frozen layer, the low permeability sustains water-rich surface conditions; this basin exhibits a significant increasing trend of runoff (45).
Over the past 70 years, runoff to the Arctic Ocean has increased by an estimated 7% (12). Change in the amount of freshwater reaching the Arctic Ocean affects sea-ice formation and may alter the oceanic thermohaline circulation (13). Model results indicate that discharge grows by a further 28% by 2100, mostly due to increases in precipitation that exceed increases in evaporation, although 15% of the increase is attributed to contributions from thawing permafrost (14).
Adaptation strategies
Introduction of global warming considerations in construction projections would lead to an increase of depth of piles for basement location and the depth of pre-building ground thawing. The choice of building approaches should also be made taking into account long-term projections of ground temperature regime (17).
Adaptation measures for present construction include (17):
- geological and engineering monitoring of thermal properties of ground of basements and sites of construction, and
- protection of basements of buildings by the use of additional options for temperature lowering.
The oil and gas industry has much experience in working in harsh conditions and there are many examples of innovative technical solutions to adapt to challenging environments. For example, Alaska faces similar concerns to Arctic and Siberian Russia but has demonstrated increased resilience to changing climate (18):
- Construction standards have been adapted to reflect changing conditions and to reduce the vulnerability of infrastructure to melting permafrost, e.g. deeper pilings are used, air is allowed to circulate beneath buildings, thicker insulation is employed, and facilities are located on gravel pads or other insulated materials. Buildings and infrastructure are generally lighter weight and subject to regular repair and maintenance programs.
- The Trans‐Alaska Oil Pipeline is an example of good adaption. Here a range of measures are employed to increase resilience including elevating the pipeline above ground level in areas of excess ice; using vertical supports with heat pipes to cool permafrost in winter, lower the mean ground temperature and prevent thaw in summer; and burying sections of the pipeline with thick insulation and refrigeration.
Technical guide
The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and its National Permafrost Working Group developed a Technical Guide, CSA Plus 4011-10, on Infrastructure in Permafrost: A Guideline for Climate Change Adaptation, that directly incorporated climate change temperature projections from an ensemble of climate change models. This CSA Guide considered climate change projections of temperature and precipitation and incorporated risks from warming and thawing permafrost to foundations over the planned life spans of the structure (24). The guide suggested possible adaptation options, taking into account the varying levels of risks and the consequences of failure for foundations of structures, whether buildings, water treatment plants, towers, tank farms, tailings ponds, or other infrastructure (25).
References
The references below are cited in full in a separate map 'References'. Please click here if you are looking for the full references for Russia.
- Anisimov and Selena (2006)
- Roshydromet (2005), in: US National Intelligence Council (2009)
- US National Intelligence Council (2009)
- Climate Change Risk Management Ltd (2008)
- Anisimov and Reneva (2006), in: Climate Change Risk Management Ltd (2008)
- Roshydromet (2008)
- WWF Russia and OXFAM (2008)
- Russian Federation,Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation on Climate Change Problems (1995)
- Hobbie et al. (2000), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Christensen et al. (2004), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Goulden et al. (1998), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Peterson et al. (2002), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Arnell (2005), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Anderson (ed.) (2007)
- Betts (2000), in: Lawrence and Slater (2005)
- Russian Federation, Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation on Climate Change (2002)
- US Arctic Research Commission (2003), in: Ebinger et al. (2008)
- IPCC (2012)
- Romanovsky et al. (2010), in: IPCC (2012)
- Zhang et al. (2005), in: IPCC (2012)
- SWIPA (2011), in: IPCC (2012)
- Anisimov and Belolutskaya (2002); Anisimov and Lavrov (2004), both in: IPCC (2012)
- Hayley and Horne (2008); NRTEE (2009); CSA (2010a); Smith et al. (2010); Grosse et al. (2011), all in: IPCC (2012)
- NRTEE (2009); CSA (2010a), both in: IPCC (2012)
- Schuur et al. (2015)
- IPCC (2013), in: Schuur et al. (2015)
- Zimov et al. (2006); Tarnocai et al. (2009), both in: Schuur et al. (2015)
- Guo and Wang (2017)
- Guo et al. (2012); Lan et al. (2015); Liljedahl et al. (2016), all in: Guo and Wang (2017)
- Yang et al. (2010, 2014); Guo et al. (2011a, b); Li and Chen (2013); Yi et al. (2014); Qin et al. (2014), all in: Guo and Wang (2017)
- Guo and Sun (2015), in: Guo and Wang (2017)
- Schuur et al. (2009, 2015); Koven et al. (2011); Burke et al. (2013), all in: Guo and Wang (2017)
- Hartmann et al. (2013), in: Guo and Wang (2017)
- Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Instane and Anisimov (2008), in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Nelson et al. (2001); Hong et al. (2014), both in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Roshydromet (2017), in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Romanovsky et al. (2010); Drozdov et al. (2015), both in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Khrustalev et al. (2011); Streletskiy et al. (2014), both in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Khrustalev and Davidova (2007); Anisimov et al. (2010); Khrustalev et al. (2011); Grebenets et al. (2012); Streletskiy et al. (2012a); Shiklomanov and Streletskiy (2013), all in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Streletskiy et al. (2012a); Streletskiy and Shiklomanov (2016), both in: Streletskiy et al. (2019)
- Vasiliev et al. (2020)
- Talucci et al. (2022)
- Han and Menzel (2022)
- Melnikov et al. (2022)