Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey

Previously in ClimateChangePost

<

At the end of this century, several heat waves per year will occur in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The number of heat wave days will increase by 20 - 130 days per year.

The global area of dryland is increasing rapidly. This was shown from data over the period 1948–2005, and seems to proceed towards the end of this century.

Studies have shown that in the eastern Mediterranean, the intensity, length and number of heat waves have increased by a factor of six to eight since the 1960s. Not all studies confirm

Across the Balkan Peninsula and Turkey climate change is particularly rapid, and especially summer temperatures are expected to increase strongly.

The Euphrates–Tigris Basin hosts the two important snow-fed rivers of the Middle East, and its water resources are critical for the hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and ...

Projected warming over Turkey’s climatic regions in 2100 under SRES A2 emission scenario is in the range of 2–5°C ...

Flash floods associated with intense and prolonged rainstorms are a common phenomenon, especially in coastal parts of Turkey ...

The likely effects of climate change on the water resources of Turkey have been investigated for 2040–2069 and 2070–2099 compared with 1961–1990 ...

>

I recommend

National plans/strategies for Turkey

  • Sixth National Communication of Turkey under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2014). Download.

Reports/papers that focus on important Turkish topics

  • Climate Change: observations, projections and impacts. Downloads.

Reports/papers that present a sound overview for Europe

  • Eisenreich (2005). Climate change and the European water dimension. A report to the European water directors.
  • European Environment Agency (2005). Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in Europe. Download.
  • European Environment Agency, JRC and WHO (2008). Impact of Europe’s changing climate – 2008 indicator-based assessment. Download.

Reports/papers that focus on specific topics, relevant for all of Europe

  • Agriculture: Rounsevell et al. (2005). Future scenarios of European agricultural land use II. Projecting changes in cropland and grassland. Download.
  • Agriculture: Fischer et al. (2005). Socio-economic and climate change impacts on agriculture: an integrated assessment, 1990–2080. Download.
  • Biodiversity: Thuiller et al. (2005). Climate change threats to plant diversity in Europe. Download.
  • Coastal erosion: Salman et al. (2004). Living with coastal erosion in Europe: sediment and space for sustainability. Download.
  • Droughts: Blenkinsop and Fowler (2007). Changes in European drought characteristics projected by the PRUDENCE regional climate models. Download.
  • Droughts: European Environment Agency (2009). Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought. Download.
  • Forestry: Seppälä et al. (2009). Adaptation of forests and people to climate change. A global assessment report. Download.
  • Health: Kosatsky (2005). The 2003 European heat waves. Download.
  • Health: WHO (2008). Protecting health in Europe from climate change. Download.
  • Insurance and Business: Mills et al. (2005). Availability and affordability of insurance under climate change. A growing challenge for the U.S. Download.
  • Security and Crisis management: German Advisory Council on Global Change (2007). World in transition: Climate change as a security risk. Summary for policy-makers. Download.
  • Storms: Gardiner et al. (2010). Destructive storms in European forests: Past and forthcoming impacts. Download.
  • Storms: Pinto et al. (2007). Changing European storm loss potentials under modified climate conditions according to ensemble simulations of the ECHAM5/MPI-OM1 GCM. Download.
  • Tourism: Deutsche Bank Research (2008). Climate change and tourism: Where will the journey lead? Download.

EU funded Research Projects

Security and Crisis management Turkey

A very detailed overview on security implications of climate change has been presented by O’Brien et al. (2008) in the report: Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation and Human Security. An extensive summary of this report is presented on the page for Norway. Most of the information below is from papers by the World Bank (2008), the European Commission (2008) and the German Advisory Council on Global Change (2007).

Vulnerabilities - Turkey

Water stress

The possible effects of climate change at regional scale in each basin would be to amplify the existing scarcity and allocation problems. This in turn, will worsen current conflicts among water users, that are already observed as a result of intensive anthropogenic activity in some Turkish basins (3).

The Great Anatolia Project (GAP) may be an example of security issues related to (climate change induced) water issues. This project involves building 21 large dams and 19 hydroelectric plants on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in south-eastern Turkey, simultaneously irrigating an area two-and-one-half times the size of Belgium and generating half as much energy as all of Turkey currently uses (5). Syria and Iraq in particular have been concerned with the impact of these works on the quantity of water which they will receive from these rivers in the future. Despite longstanding differences of opinion, in March 2008, the three co-riparians declared their will to cooperate by establishing a joint water institute with experts from each country (6). Recent higher politics (Turkey condemning the brutal suppression of the Syrian people by the Assad regime, and Turkey’s military incursions to the PKK camps in northern Iraq) may interfere with these developments, however (7).


Another issue complicating dialogue among riparians is the fact that many water sharing agreements fail to consider the issue of climate change. This observation is valid not only for the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, but also the Maritsa Basin and it constitutes the gist of related regional conflicts (7).

Turkey does not suffer from an influx of migrants creating heavy burdens. Furthermore, there is no evidence linking migrant flows to climate-driven factors (7).

Food security

Recent global-scale studies suggest that Turkey may not face major food insecurity under climate change scenarios, when food supply production from terrestrial biomes is considered (9). However, if food supply from marine capture fisheries is considered, then the outlook is less optimistic (10).

Perhaps the most speculative argument about the link between climate change and violent conflict involves a heat wave in July 2010 in the wider Black Sea basin, leading to a food crisis and thence catalyzing the Arab Spring of 2011. As global warming hit the wheat production of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, production in Romania and Bulgaria also witnessed a similar drama on account of heavy rain. The problem intensified with the blazing fires accompanying the drought in the Black Sea region, especially in Russia and Ukraine. This led to a soaring rise of global food prices, which also affected meat and dairy prices. As the major market for these foodstuffs constituted Middle Eastern countries including Turkey, Egypt and Syria, various responses ranging from protests to revolts followed in return (8).

Vulnerabilities - According to the European Commission

Since the EU’s neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, e.g. North Africa and the Middle East, migratory pressure at the European Union's borders and political instability and conflicts could increase in the future. The European Commission published a paper that enumerates all the threats driven by climate change and related in one way or another to security issues (1):


  • Conflicts over diminished resources: shortage of water, reduction of agricultural land, increased flooding and longer droughts may lead to economic losses and increased food prices. The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicised.
  • Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure: Mega-cities, with their supporting infrastructure, such as port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects. The East coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises will lead to immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations.
  • Loss of territory and border disputes: Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.
  • Environmentally-induced migration: Europe must expect more migration from its neighbouring and more vulnerable countries.
  • Situations of fragility and radicalization: Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face.
  • Tension over energy supply: Intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources is, and will continue to be, a cause of instability. There is a possibility of greater energy insecurity and greater competition for resources. As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for resources will intensify.
  • Pressure on international governance: Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally.

Vulnerabilities - According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change

Climate-induced conflict constellations

The German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU) made an assessment on global security risks of climate change (2). WBGU considers that climate-induced inter-state wars are unlikely to occur. However, climate change could well trigger national and international distributional conflicts and intensify problems already hard to manage such as state failure, the erosion of social order, and rising violence. WBGU identifies four conflict constellations in which critical developments can be anticipated as a result of climate change and which may occur with similar characteristics in different regions of the world. “Conflict constellations” are defined as typical causal linkages at the interface of environment and society, whose dynamic can lead to social destabilization and, in the end, to violence.


  1. Climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources.  1.1 billion people are currently without access to safe drinking water. The situation could worsen for hundreds of millions of people
  2. Climate-induced decline in food production.More than 850 million people worldwide are currently undernourished. This situation is likely to worsen in future as a result of climate change, due to a drop in agricultural productivity, desertification, soil salinization and water scarcity.
  3. Climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters.The risk of natural disasters occurring in many cities and industrial regions in coastal zones will be further amplified by deforestation along the upper reaches of rivers, land subsidence in large urban areas and the ever greater spatial concentration of populations and assets.
  4. Environmentally-induced migration.It can be assumed that the number of environmental migrants will substantially rise in future due to the impacts of climate change. Most environmental migration is initially likely to occur within national borders. Transboundary environmental migration will mainly take the form of south-south migration, but Europe and North America must also expect substantially increased migratory pressure from regions most at risk from climate change.

Six threats to international stability and security

In light of current knowledge about the social impacts of climate change, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU) identifies the following six key threats to international security and stability which will arise if climate change mitigation fails (2):

  1. Possible increase in the number of weak and fragile states as a result of climate change.
  2. Risks for global economic development.Unabated climate change is likely to result in substantially reduced rates of growth. This will increasingly limit the economic scope, at national and international level.
  3. Risks of growing international distributional conflicts between the main drivers of climate change and those most affected.A key line of conflict in global politics in the 21st century would divide not only the industrialized and the developing countries, but also the rapidly growing newly industrializing countries and the poorer developing countries. The international community is ill-prepared at present for this type of distributional conflict.
  4. The risk to human rights and the industrialized countries’ legitimacy as global governance actors.Unabated climate change could plunge the industrialized countries in particular into crises of legitimacy and limit their international scope for action.
  5. Triggering and intensification of migration.The associated conflict potential is considerable, especially as “environmental migrants” are currently not provided for in international law.
  6. Overstretching of classic security policy.A climate-induced increase in the number of weak and fragile states or even the destabilization of entire sub regions would overstretch conventional security policy.

Definition of water security according to the UNDP

Water security is about ensuring that every person has reliable access to enough safe water at an affordable price so as to lead a healthy, dignified and productive life, while maintaining the ecological systems that provide water and which also depend on water. If these conditions are not met, or if access to water is disrupted, people face acute human security risks transmitted through poor health and the disruption of livelihoods. Sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic use are the five core attributes that represent the foundations for water security (4).

Adaptation strategies - According to the World Bank

According to a report of the World Bank and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (11), the countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe should focus on:


  • Developing and strengthening an institutional and legislative disaster risk management framework to assist in budget appropriations, planning, and finally the implementation of disaster risk management plans. Ensuring legal statutes are clear and hazard risk management is properly funded are the first steps. A strong system should have a robust preparedness program with plans, training, and exercises for all levels of its emergency management system;
  • Improve disaster risk management capacityby clarifying the roles and responsibilities of local and national governmental bodies in risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response;
  • Completing hazard risk assessments and corresponding hazard maps. Risk assessments are also crucial for policymakers to evaluate the costs and benefits of risk mitigation investments and to prioritize these investments;
  • Hazard-specific investments toreduce the risk of hydrometeorological hazards and increase adaptive capacity;
  • Strengthen technical capacity of emergency responders. This includes purchasing personal protective equipment, tools, and vehicles, emergency communications and information systems, and public awareness of natural hazard risks and of preparedness and response actions;
  • The use and price of pooled risk approaches, capital market mechanisms, insurance and credit instruments. These measures can be calculated in combination to reduce the cost of financial protection for emergency reconstruction and to avoid the economic and budgetary disruptions this would otherwise entail.

Adaptation strategies - According to the European Commission

According to the European Commission (1), the EU should focus on:

  • Enhancing capacities at the EU level: build up knowledge and assess the EU's own capacities, followed by an improvement in the prevention of, and preparedness for early responses to, disasters and conflicts. Monitoring and early warning needs to include in particular situations of state fragility and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, border disputes, impact on human rights and potential migratory movements.
  • EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security: the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security.
  • Cooperation with third countries: greater prioritisation and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, natural resource management, technology transfer, trans-boundary environmental cooperation (inter alia water and land), institutional strengthening and capacity building for crisis management.

Adaptation strategies - According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change

According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU) a number of initiatives are needed (2):


  1. Shaping global political change.In order to ensure the acceptance and, above all, the constructive participation of the ascendant new world powers China and India, a multilateral order is needed which is viewed as fair by all countries.
  2. Reforming the United Nations.In general, WBGU is in favour of better coordinating the efforts of the relevant organizations and programmes under the auspices of the UN and significantly enhancing their role in the interests of prevention.
  3. Ambitiously pursuing international climate policy.WBGU recommends the adoption, as an international standard, of a global temperature guard rail limiting the rise in near-surface air temperature to a maximum of 2°C relative to the pre-industrial value.
  4. Implementing the energy turnaround in the EU.In order to be a credible negotiating partner within the climate process, the European Union should achieve its Kyoto commitments and set more far reaching and ambitious reduction targets for the future. In WBGU’s view, a 30 % reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared with the 1990 baseline and an 80 % reduction target by 2050 are appropriate.
  5. Developing mitigation strategies through partnerships. In development cooperation, path dependencies of emissions-intensive technologies should be avoided, and high priority should be granted to the promotion of sustainable energy systems in order to overcome energy poverty.
  6. Supporting adaptation strategies for developing countries.Adapting water resources management to climate change and avoiding water crises, a.o. in order to avoid water conflicts, cooperation on transboundary water management should be encouraged for regions sharing waters. Focus should also be on gearing agriculture to climate change.
  7. Stabilizing fragile states and weak states that are additionally threatened by climate change. Crisis prevention costs far less than crisis management at a later stage. Specifically, fragile states’ capacities to manage environmental risks must be maintained and reinforced, and if necessary re-established, even under difficult political and economic conditions.
  8. Managing migration through cooperation and further developing international law.
  9. Expanding global information and early warning systems.Both the gradual changes caused by climate change and the natural disasters which are expected to occur with increasing frequency could destabilize the affected regions and, in extreme cases, constitute a major risk factor for national and international security. Global information and early warning systems can therefore do much to mitigate these adverse effects and make a major contribution to conflict and crisis prevention.

WBGU anticipates that in the event of mitigation efforts failing, climate-induced security risks will begin to manifest themselves in various regions of the world from around 2025–2040. The key challenge is to take resolute climate policy action within the next 10–15 years, in order to avert the socioeconomic distortions and implications for international security that will otherwise intensify in subsequent decades (2).

References

The references below are cited in full in a separate map 'References'. Please click here if you are looking for the full references for Turkey.

  1. European Commission (2008)
  2. German Advisory Council on Global Change (2007)
  3. Güven (2007)
  4. UNDP (2009)
  5. Lyne (1991)
  6. Daoudy (2008), in: Albayrakoğlu (2011)
  7. Albayrakoğlu (2011)
  8. Roubanis-Zefi Dimadama (2011), in: Albayrakoğlu (2011)
  9. Falkenmark et al. (2009); Wu et al. (2011), both in: MET Office (2011)
  10. Allison et al. (2009), in: MET Office (2011)
  11. Pollner et al. (2008)
Close